In an article recently posted on IEEE Spectrum's website, the notion of semiconductor sabotage is discussed. One theory that is laid out (but unproven) is that Israeli forces were able to render radar systems ineffective during a raid carried out against supposed nuclear facilites located in northeastern Syria. Many suspect that the Israelis were able to do this due to a "backdoor" installed in the chips used in the radar. While unproven (the article states on several occasions that there is a certain level of impractability in carrying out such operations) the questions it brings to the table are one that should be examined. As the process of globalization moves forward, the trust we instill in comanpies outside of the U.S. producing something as ubquitous as the microchip should be called into question. Second, should the manufacture of chips used in ultrasensitive projects like satellites and components for key weapons systems be entrusted to anyone other the military itself? And finally, how do we manage these questions without becoming draconian or irresponsible?
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